ABSTRACT Ensuring the security and privacy of vehicle is one of the critical requirements for the safety and reliability of vehicular ad hoc networks. A variety of (conditional) anonymous authentication schemes, including group/ring signatures, pseudo-identity-based and PKI-based approaches, have been proposed to achieve highly effective privacy-preserving authentications. A recent effort, i.e., randomized authentication, leverages homomorphic encryption for vehicles to self-generate authenticated identities to achieve full anonymity. Notwithstanding a very attractive feature to prevent single-party traceability, randomized authentication faces a great challenge on the centralized data updating and the frequent clock synchronizations. It also fails to meet the necessity of non-repudiation. In this paper, we present a rigorous decentralized randomized authentication framework with conditional privacy preservation. We use homomorphic encryption and a one-way hash chain for a vehicle to self-generate randomized pseudoidentities. We deploy the pseudonym validation mechanism over the roadside units in order to support decentralized mutual identity authentication and ownership validation of vehicles in a loosely coupled or a compound manner. Our framework can provide rigorous Level 3 privacy and traceability of vehicles. We also provide a security condition on valid random values to ensure the uniqueness of pseudonym and nonrepudiation of vehicles. The performance evaluation shows that our framework is generally more efficient on infrastructures in terms of computational and communication overheads than the state-of-the-art randomized authentications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Authentication has been widely considered as one of the critical security components of VANETs [1] . It is essential to identify valid participants, ensure participants are who they claim to be, and prevent attackers from tampering messages transmitted through the wireless channel. Privacy preservation is an important security parameter in the authentication and communication of VANETs [2] . When the vehicle's private data, e.g. identity or position, are captured by the adversary through its messages, the adversary could trace the moving route of vehicles, profile the user and launch different attacks, e.g. masquerading or impersonation attack, causing harm to road safety. To address the privacy preservation issues, it is usually considered necessary for some trusted authority to retrieve the real identity from messages beyond the anonymity of vehicle to other peers whenever a dispute appears. Such privacy requirement is called conditional privacy. Lu et al. [3] defined three levels of conditional privacy. Recent efforts have aimed at achieving formally proved Level 3 privacy [4] . On such privacy level, not only the safety messages are anonymously authenticated, but also unlinkability is always held to prevent an adversary from inferring vehicle's feature using collected messages of a particular vehicle.
Among the previous studies addressing conditional privacy-preserving authentication of VANETs [3] - [16] , group signature schemes [5] can ensure unlinkability by signing messages with group key on behalf of the group, but still have significant cost on verification and key updating. The revocable ring signature schemes [6] , [7] can efficiently deal with the growing revocation list, whereas the communication overhead increases proportionally in that the length of signature relies on the size of ring. Besides the signature-based approaches, it has been realized that (pseudo-)identity-based (ID-based) authentication schemes [8] - [11] are generally more efficient than centralized PKI-based authentication schemes [3] , [4] , [12] , [13] . On both sides, recent approaches have combined regular ID-based signatures with ID-based online/offline signatures to alleviate the computational and verification overhead [11] , or decentralized the functionality of certificate authority to reduce the communication overhead [4] , [16] .
Randomized authentications, i.e. RAU [14] and RAU+ [15] , leverage homomorphic encryption to provide a strong privacy-preserving authentication framework. The pseudonyms are generated by vehicle, and verified for validity by the cloud-based verification server. A very attractive feature of randomized authentication is that the traceability can only be achieved by a collaboration of different servers instead of any individual server. However, several practicability and security issues are not satisfactorily dealt with. First, cloud-based deployment of conceptually centralized verification server will be up against significant storage and updating overhead when receiving the newest randomized identities in real time from the registration server. Thus more efficient decentralized verification servers are needed. Second, the registration server and vehicle respectively generate new randomized identity of vehicle according to predefined time slot and seeds. This procedure heavily relies on clock synchronization between vehicle and registration server, and it is inefficient and resource consuming. Moreover, if the time slot is inappropriately chosen, the randomized identity of vehicle is not ensured to be used only once so that the unlinkability may be violated and the movement of vehicle may be tracked on verification server. Third, non-repudiation may be violated since the pseudonyms of two vehicles may conflict with each other occasionally.
In this work, we propose a RIgorous Decentralized Randomized Authentication framework, i.e. Ridra for short. It is a new conditional privacy-preserving authentication framework conforming to Level 3 privacy with unlinkability, as well as non-repudiation. In this framework, we use homomorphic encryption for vehicle to generate randomized pseudo-identity. Instead of using cloud-based verification server, we deploy pseudonym validation over distributed roadside units, and leverage the hash chain to avoid real-time pseudonym list updating on the verification server. We classify the vehicle-to-vehicle authentications into different scenarios to reduce the communication overhead between vehicles. We also propose a loosely coupled ownership validation to confirm the valid pseudonyms are owned by the correct vehicle. By updating the pseudonym of vehicle during each vehicle-to-infrastructure authentication and the corresponding table entry in trusted authority, our framework provides strict unlinkability as well as the traceability for trusted authority to derive vehicle's real identity. We prove the essential security properties of Level 3 privacy automatically with ProVerif, give the security condition for non-repudiation, and compare the computational and communication overheads with the state-of-art randomized authentications.
Based on the aforementioned challenges and limitations of randomized authentications, the main novelties of this work are summarized as follows. 1) Pseudonym validation, deployed on distributed stationary roadside units instead of on cloud, uses the offline registered key value of one-way hash chain to avoid the online pseudonym list updating on the verification server.
2) The pseudonyms of vehicle are generated with homomorphic encryption and the public key of the trusted authority. These pseudonyms are randomized by hash values to provide anonymity, and the real identity of vehicles are only traceable by the trusted authority.
3) The correlations between pseudonyms and the real identity of vehicle, i.e. the ownership of pseudonyms, are only confirmable by the trusted authority through an ownership validation procedure either loosely coupled or tightly compound with the identity authentication. 4) We have proved the essential security properties of Level 3 privacy, especially the strict unlinkability, for our framework with the assistance of ProVerif. We have also provided and proved a security condition on random value to ensure the uniqueness of pseudonym and the non-repudiation of vehicles.
The rest of this paper is systematized as follows. Section II reviews the related work. Section III presents the preliminaries of additive homomorphic encryption, as well as the network and threat model. Section IV gives our authentication framework. Section V describes the security analysis, the proof of security condition, and the verification of security properties. Section VI demonstrates the efficiency of our framework, and Section VII concludes our work.
II. RELATED WORK
The authentication schemes in VANETs can be classified into three categories, cryptography-based, signature-based, and verification-based [2] . To address privacy preservation, typical approaches can be based on public-key cryptography, ID-based cryptography, and group signatures.
Group signature schemes usually sign the messages anonymously with sender's private key and verify the signature with the group public key by receivers. And the authority can reveal the identity of sender for dispute situation. Guo et al. [17] sketched a security framework for VANET communications based on group signatures without presenting any concrete instantiation nor experimental analysis. GSIS [5] utilizes short group signature scheme for V2V authentication and ID-based signature scheme for ensuring the authenticity of roadside infrastructures. The main advantage of group signature is that they can guarantee the unlinkability of messages since group members can anonymously sign on behalf of the group. Meanwhile, the group signature-based VOLUME 6, 2018 schemes also have disadvantages. They cannot effectively deal with compromised member revocation and have significant cost on signature verification and key updating. As the complement of group signature-based approaches, ring signature can avoid the signer to be traced by some authority. Gamage et al. [18] proposed an ID-based ring signature scheme to provide full privacy preservation for the signer of authenticatable message without any traceability. Later on, revocable ring signature [19] has also been used to develop efficient and spontaneous inter-vehicle authentication [6] with conditional privacy preservation. The communication overhead of ring-based signature schemes usually increase proportionally in that the length of signature relies on the size of ring. Xiong et al. [20] proposed a scheme which conceals the vehicle's identity using proxy re-signature for RSU to translate the valid vehicle's signatures to one that is valid w.r.t TA's public key. The message sender's authenticity can be verified anonymously by any vehicle with TA's public key.
Public key based approaches usually require the vehicle to hold its own private key and may cause a large amount of communication and computation overhead to manage the certificates of vehicles and the certificate revocation lists (CRLs). Raya and Hubaux [12] used asymmetric key pairs and the corresponding anonymous certificates for each vehicle to hide vehicle's real identity, and realized the functions of authentication and integrity at every turn with randomly chosen key pair and the public key infrastructure (PKI). ECPP [3] improves the efficiency of authentication by leveraging fast safety-message verification and on-the-fly temporary anonymous key generation for the keys storage minimization. Frequent requests for new anonymous certificates are necessary for vehicle to avoid being traced. PASS [13] is a pseudonymous authentication scheme with efficient certificate revocation and updating mechanism equipped along the roadside units adopting the proxy resignature scheme for RSU to re-sign and generate certificates as issued by itself. 2FLIP [4] combines decentralized CA and biological-password-based two-factor authentication and resorts to lightweight hash and MAC operations to improve efficiency. Recent hybrid approach [16] has combined the advantage of group signature-based schemes and public keybased schemes to provide traceability through in-pseudonym trapdoor mechanism, and to avoid vehicle from being distinguished among regional groups. A kind of modular CA configurable over clouds is also proposed to improve the overall efficiency of system.
Compared with the public key-based approaches, ID-based approaches [8] - [11] , [21] need no certificate to anonymize the real identity of vehicles, thus can avoid certificate management problem in PKI. These approaches are considered to be more cost-effective and have reduced communication overheads by using digital signature schemes instead of online certificate management. Zhang et al. [8] proposed to use identity-based signature for generating the private key of pseudonyms, and to provide simultaneous (batch) signature verification on V2I communication for reducing verification cost. Tamper-proof device is required by each vehicle to store master secret. Sun et al. [9] proposed a threshold signaturebased mechanism as well as a privacy-preserving defense mechanism based on the threshold authentication. It saves the storage space and reduces the message overhead when compared to typical public key-based approaches. He et al. [10] presented a privacy-preserving mutual authentication scheme that uses elliptic curve cryptography instead of bilinear pairing operation to save the computational costs caused by such operation. Batch verification was integrated to further improve the performance. ACPN [11] takes the identitybased online/offline signature (IBOOS) to reduce the computation overhead in the V2V authentications. In order to avoid too many pseudonyms updated during the movement of vehicles, the pseudo-identities and the corresponding offline signatures are organized regionally and the V2V authentications are divided into inner-RSU and cross-RSU authentications. Zhang et al. [21] presented a distributed aggregate authentication which allows each vehicle to generate one-time ID-based signatures aggregatively verifiable by other vehicles. Capability constrained tamper-proof device is needed by vehicle to store the master secret of the trusted authority.
In recent years, homomorphic encryption schemes have also been found useful in the vehicular networks for the privacy preservation of data aggregation [22] , [23] , auctionbased resource allocation [24] , [25] , verification on encrypted messages and domain-specific knowledge [26] , [27] , and anonymous authentications [14] , [15] , [28] . To address the anonymous authentications, Paillier's homomorphic addition can be used by the certification authority to verify the authenticity of messages for RSU [28] . Homomorphic encryption is also utilized to easily generate new randomized pseudo-identities [14] , [15] . Although the real identity of the authentication requester can be preserved unknown from any individual authentication server, the time synchronization requirement on the authentication servers and vehicles for pseudonym updating affects the practicability of these approaches, and the cloud-based deployment of verification server hardly supports real-time pseudonym list updating. Both constraints make these approaches different from this work.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the preliminary concepts of additive homomorphic encryption and the network and threat models used in our framework.
A. PAILLIER's HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
The additive homomorphic public key encryption system is a tuple (E pk , D sk , +, * ). The additive homomorphic encryption function E pk is defined to support
Consequently, we have E(x) c = E(c · x) for constant c. Even if y 1 = E pk (x) and y 2 = E pk (x) and y 1 = y 2 due to randomness, the additive homomorphic decryption function 50360 VOLUME 6, 2018 D sk should always satisfy D sk (y 1 ) = D sk (y 2 ) = x. For reality, we choose Paillier public-key encryption system [29] in our approach. Let n = (2p+1)(2q+1) and λ = 2pq, where p and q are primes.
The encryption system consists of the following algorithms:
1) E pk : Given message x ∈ Z n , public key pk = (n, g), and random number r ∈ Z * n , the ciphertext can be calculated as y = E pk (x, r) = g x · r n mod n 2 . 2) D sk : Given ciphertext y ∈ Z * n 2 and private key sk = (λ, µ), the plain-text message
The homomorphic properties used in this work are listed as below.
3) Self-blinding. With the addition property, we can easily derive that E pk (x, r 1 ) * E pk (0, r 2 ) = E pk (x, r 1 · r 2 ), therefore any ciphertext can be publicly changed into another ciphertext without affecting the plaintext. 4) D sk (E pk (x, r)) = x regardless of the choice of random value r, therefore for any y 1 = E pk (x, r 1 ) and y 2 = E pk (x, r 2 ), it will hold that D sk (y 1 ) = D sk (y 2 ). Moreover, we define the digital signature scheme over this additive homomorphic encryption system [30] . Let the hash function h(.) be a random oracle, SIG sk (x) can be defined as
The notations and their descriptions used in our framework are listed in Table 1 .
B. NETWORK AND THREAT MODEL
In a VANET, moving vehicles and roadside infrastructures intercommunicate and exchange respective node information, e.g. the speed or location of the vehicles. In a general setting of VANETs, the vehicular communication system usually consists of three different kinds of principals [1] : mobile vehicle (V), roadside unit (RSU), and trusted authority (TA). Vehicles are equipped with certain radio interface or On-Board Unit (OBU) that support the construction and operations of wireless ad hoc networks. TA is the certification authority, which may be served as a trusted third party by automobile manufacturers or administrative agency. A finite number of RSUs are stationarily mounted along the roadside to facilitate the vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications. RSUs should cover the wireless vehicular communications. Meanwhile, the vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications allow each individual vehicle to monitor the location, speed, and lane change information of other nearby vehicles, so far as to automatically predict potential collisions.
In our approach, we adopt the following threat model. Firstly, the connections between RSUs as well as between RSU and TA are supposed to be secure and play a part of the connections between vehicles and TA. Secondly, an attacker may forge, modify or block some packets from senders. Therefore, man-in-the-middle attack and replay attack are feasible. Thirdly, a malicious vehicle may impersonate to be another vehicle or use different vehicles' identities at the same time. Consequently, the attacker can capture the critical responses to another entity or launch false requests to the roadside infrastructures. In addition, he may deny the involvement in the procedure of communications. Fourthly, an attacker may compromise some RSU and passively eavesdrop sensitive information, including the real identity of the vehicle, to infer some privacy of users. Without loss of generality, we suppose that TA cannot be compromised to record the historical data and infer their correlations by attackers.
IV. FRAMEWORK OF RIDRA
In our infrastructure, TA maintains the correlations between the identity and public key of each RSU. Before the registration of vehicles, RSU should have known the TA's public key pk TA , and have required TA to sign over its public key, i.e. SIG TA (pk RSU ).
A. VEHICLE REGISTRATION
Initially, each vehicle v performs off-line registration with TA using its real identity, i.e. ID v , and the last key value k 0 v of a one-way hash chain After this registration, TA stores a triple (PS 0 v , PS 0 v , 0) for the vehicle in a table, and discards ID v to prevent the real identity of vehicle from being compromised through the local data of TA. The second element PS 0 v of this triple is updatable to record the current pseudonym used by vehicle and will be modified at the end of each V2I authentication. Also, the initial value 0 is updated in the V2I authentication to record the newest value of c for the ownership validation of pseudonym. The procedures of the following authentications are presented in Table 2 .
B. V2I AUTHENTICATIONS
Vehicles move rapidly across different regions of RSU. In order to avoid its trajectory to be tracked by the attacker, each time the vehicle launches a pseudonym authentication to an RSU, it has to update its pseudonyms and notify this update to TA for subsequent validations.
Step 
are random values. c will be sent to TA and utilized in the phase of ownership validation. d is chosen for encrypting 0. E pk TA (0, d) is useful to avoid c to be deduced by the attacker through the power multiplication of PS l v . Then, the RSU replies u, its own public key pk RSU i , as well as two signatures to V v . The first signature is from TA to prove the validity of RSU's public key. The second signature is to prove the validity of pseudonym in the later phase.
After receiving the message from RSU, the vehicle firstly verifies pk RSU i using pk TA and the signature SIG TA (pk RSU i ). Then it solves the challenge u and derives a value ϕ, which is defined as
is the solution to u, and has a form of E pk TA (c, _). E pk TA (0, r ) is used to randomize u ID −1 v to prevent ID −1 v being inferred from u and ϕ. The value ϕ will be used to prove the real owner of the current pseudonym.
Step 3: The RSU sends PS 0 v , c and PS l v to TA. TA will then update the triple of vehicle to (PS 0 v , PS l v , c) for the traceability of vehicle and the ownership validation.
The length of hash chain is critical to the practicability of the V2I authentication. For a normal use in city, vehicle should hold a hash chain of around 2 10 to 2 12 hash values to support a monthly registration. Because the computational ability of RSU cannot afford about 2 10 
C. V2V AUTHENTICATIONS
The V2V authentication is used to ensure the pseudonym of both peer vehicles are legitimate before they share any information. Mutual V2V authentication can be divided into two cases, inner-RSU V2V authentication and cross-RSU V2V authentication. In both cases, a vehicle V v should first broadcast an authentication message to show its willing of authenticated communication.
Step 1: This authentication message contains the current pseudonym of V v and the signature SIG RSU i (PS l v ) from its RSU which proves the authenticity of V v . The identity and the public key of its RSU are respectively used by the subsequent two cases to validate PS l v . The signature from TA is used to ensure the integrity of public key.
1) INNER-RSU V2V AUTHENTICATION
Step 2: In this scenario, a vehicle V w identifies V v as in the same domain through the received ID i , therefore V w and V v must have the same public key of RSU. With the public key of RSU obtained in the V2I authentication, V w verifies the received signature SIG RSU i (PS l v ) to validate the pseudonym PS l v . If the pseudonym of V v is valid, V w will send its current pseudonym PS l w and the signature from RSU in return for mutual authentication.
2) CROSS-RSU V2V AUTHENTICATION
Step 2': In this scenario, V v and V w are in different domains of RSU, therefore they hold different public key of RSU. After observing V v in a different domain through ID i , V w cannot directly validate the pseudonym by the public key of its own RSU. He should verify the received signature signed by TA to validate the received public key pk RSU i , and then use pk RSU i to validate the pseudonym. If PS l v is valid, V w sends in return an almost symmetric message to V v , including the public key of V w 's RSU whose integrity is ensured by the signature from TA. V v performs the cross-RSU authentication due to the length of message, and uses pk RSU j to validate PS l w . Consequently, the mutual authentication to the pseudonyms of vehicle is achieved in both scenarios. The authentications presented in this section focus on ensuring the pseudonyms used by vehicles are valid ones. In these procedures, a vehicle cannot ensure a received pseudonym is from the owner of that pseudonym. It is necessary to perform more validation to prevent such impersonation.
D. STANDALONE OWNERSHIP VALIDATION
In addition to the V2V authentication, each vehicle may want to confirm that the valid pseudonyms from the other peer vehicle are owned by the correct vehicle. Without any publickey scheme for the vehicles, we should develop a procedure for this ownership validation. For clarity, we first develop the ownership validation in a separate phase. This validation procedure is identical for both inner-RSU and cross-RSU V2V authentications, as shown in Table. 2.
Step 1: If V w 's pseudonym is valid, V v encrypts its own pseudonym, its solution ϕ v to challenge u, and a time stamp with TA's public key. It sends the encryption result to V w . The encryption can avoid ϕ v to be captured by the attacker to pass the ownership validation of PS l v . The time stamp will then be recorded by TA to prevent the ciphertext being replayed by the attacker.
Step 2: V w generates a similar ciphertext containing the solution ϕ w to its own challenge, and sends it with the solution of V v to its RSU, i.e. RSU j . Then, RSU j receives the encrypted ϕ v and ϕ w and relays them to TA.
Step with SIG RSU j (PS l w ||0/1||t). The validation results from TA to RSU ensure 1) the validity of pseudonyms, 2) only the real owner who provides the correct ϕ and c can pass the validation. After this procedure, each vehicle ensures the ownership of the other one's pseudonym due to the signature of validation results derived by RSU.
E. COMPOUND V2V AUTHENTICATION WITH OWNERSHIP VALIDATION
The original V2V authentications of our framework are used to validate the pseudonym of peer vehicles. On the other hand, the vehicle's pseudonym has also been validated by TA in the phase of ownership validation, because when TA searches in its table of triples, invalid pseudonyms are impossible to be found and mapped with a value c in its table. Therefore, we may merge the V2V authentication with ownership validation to reduce the communication and computational costs. A compound procedure of pseudonym-based intervehicle authentication and ownership validation is shown in Table 3 .
In the new V2I authentication, SIG RSU i (PS l v ) need not be delivered to the vehicle, because there is no standalone V2V authentication using this signature to validate the pseudonym of vehicle. In the compound V2V authentication, the vehicle needs the public key of RSU to verify the signatures of validation results. If the two vehicles are in different domains of RSU, V w should deliver the public key of its RSU to V v , who will then use this public key to verify the signature. 
F. AGGREGATED COMPOUND V2V ANTHENTICATION
In order to reduce the overhead of connection establishment and data transmission, we further present an aggregated version of the compound V2V authentication with ownership validation. The procedure is shown in Table 4 . In this procedure, V w collects different broadcasted authentication requests respectively from a set of sender vehicles, i.e.
No matter whether they are from the same domain of V w 's RSU, V w just concatenates the encrypted solutions in their authentication requests and relays them to its RSU (Step 2). V w should reserve the order of concatenated ciphertexts with respect to the sender vehicles. Then, TA will concatenate the validation results, i.e. a sequence of (PS x ||(0/1) x ), and send this sequence to the RSU. The RSU signs over this sequence and relays the subsequence of 0/1 with the signature to V w (Step 3). The pseudonyms of sender vehicles do not have to be relayed to V w because the order and pseudonyms of senders have been reserved by V w . For those senders whose validation result is 1, V w distinguishes if the sender is in the same domain of RSU, and performs the Step 4 and Step 4' respectively to authenticate itself for the inner-RSU and cross-RSU cases.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the security requirements as well as the verification on the conformance of our framework to these requirements. We take a symbolic approach to prove the correctness automatically using ProVerif [31] . The primitives of ProVerif used for our analyses are listed as below:
This primitive is used for the same process with different arguments, either M or M , to trigger the difference on behaviors caused by these arguments, and report a trace directing to the triggering point. -query attacker(M ): This primitive decides whether the attacker may have M in some phase of the protocol, i.e. whether the secrecy of M is preserved by the protocol.
This primitive is a non-injective agreement deciding that the execution of f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) can imply a previous execution of f (x 1 , . . . , x n ).
f (x 1 , . . . , x n ): This primitive decides that each occurrence of f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) corresponds to a distinct previous occurrence of f (x 1 , . . . , x n ). -!Proc: This primitive means repeatedly executing an unbounded number of copies of process Proc in parallel.
A. PRIVACY PRESERVATION
This security requirement consists of anonymity and unlinkability. For anonymity, the real identity of vehicles should be hidden from the roadside infrastructures and should never be obtained by attacker on the wireless channels and compromised RSUs. For unlinkability, from any two messages from different sessions of the same vehicle, the attacker cannot find feature to infer that they are from the same vehicle. Obviously, unlinkability is stronger than anonymity since it assumes the attacker has the ability to collect messages from different sessions of authentication to perform deduction. In the vehicle registration phase, TA encrypts vehicle's real identity to generate initial pseudonyms with its public key. Later, mutative pseudonyms of vehicle are utilized for the authentication and ownership validation to prevent the release of vehicle's real identity. Therefore, no one but TA can know the vehicle's real identity. To ensure anonymity, we query attacker(idVv) and attacker(idVw) to find if the attacker may have the real identities of vehicle, i.e. idVv and idVw, at some point of the procedure. The result not attacker_ID_p6/p7
is true returned by ProVerif shows that the adversary cannot get any information about the real identities. Taking the compound procedure for example, the verification results on anonymity are given in Fig. 1a and Fig. 1b .
In the authentication phase, identity authentication could be accomplished without knowing the real identity of the vehicle. Moreover, vehicle generates a new pseudonym each time it launches a V2I authentication, that guarantees each vehicle executes subsequent inter-vehicle authentications in a specific RSU region with a unique pseudonym. Meanwhile, the ciphertext of solution ϕ differs as the pseudonym changes. Consequently, the only factor that can be associated with vehicles in the V2V authentication is the pseudonym in the messages. In order to prove the unlinkability, we firstly add replication notation ! over the processes to constitute numerous sessions for each participant. Then we add primitive choice[ps_Vv,ps_random] to the proof script of the procedure, where ps_random is a randomly generated value in pseudonym type. We get the result Observational equivalence is true (bad not derivable), shown in Fig. 1c , which indicates the adversary cannot distinguish a pseudonym of vehicle from a random value, thus can never link messages from different sessions onto one vehicle. Although the unlinkability is enforced by our framework, we cannot resist the collusion by adjacent compromised RSUs to infer the trajectories of vehicles.
B. NON-REPUDIATION
Each message from vehicle is integrated with one of the vehicle's pseudonyms, which is originated from the real identity of vehicle and is generated by the initial pseudonym and hash chain values. No vehicle can infer 1) the real identity, 2) the random value r for generating the initial pseudonym, and 3) the hash values, of another vehicle. There should be VOLUME 6, 2018 no conflict on the pseudonyms from different vehicles with distinguishable real identity. This condition can be ensured by the following theorem which puts restriction over the choice of random value for generating the first pseudonym of vehicle.
Theorem 1 (Uniqueness of Pseudonym): Suppose all the key values in hash chains are in the positive range [R min , R max ], and the random values as well as the real identities are positive. For a vehicle with real identity ID w , if the random value r w chosen by TA to generate its first pseudonym PS 0 w satisfies that, for any ID v < ID w , we have Proof: According to the definition of Paillier encryption, the mutative pseudonyms of vehicle can be decomposed as
As the parameter of TA's public key, n is a large positive number and identical for all the vehicles. For PS i v ∈ PS v and PS j w ∈ PS w , we have
w and k i v respectively in the hash chain of V w and V v . Since ID v < ID w and n is positive, we have then
v . Theorem 1 demonstrates a concrete guide on choosing a valid random value for TA to generate the first pseudonym of vehicle. Such choices of random values can prevent the pseudonyms from different vehicles from conflicting with each other. However, to make the theorem applicable, we should require the vehicles to perform their registration to TA under a strict ascending order of real identities. Otherwise, a newly registered vehicle V v may interfere with the choice of random value and the generation of initial pseudonym of some previously registered vehicle whose real identity is bigger than ID v .
Moreover, the range of hash values [R min , R max ] should be narrowed to ensure the intervals decided by the inequalities are wide enough for a large number of vehicles to choose their own valid random value. Because n is a large positive, n n 2 · (1 + n) −ID w tends to be 1. The inequality (1) in Theorem 1 can reduce to r v · (R max /R min ) ≤ r w < 1/R max . We suppose there are M vehicles in the network, and ID 1 < ID 2 < · · · < ID M . We orderly choose the random values r 1 , r 2 , · · · , r M respectively for each vehicle, such that their value should satisfy According to the uniqueness of pseudonym and the confidentiality of real identity, only the pseudonym owner can get the correct solution to the challenge for the ownership validation. A vehicle can never deny the solution is derived by itself. Meanwhile, due to the time stamp in the ciphertext of the solution, a vehicle can never deny the time of sending the authentication message. Thus, non-repudiation is guaranteed.
C. TRACEABILITY
Although the vehicles are anonymous and unlinkable in the V2V and V2I communications, it is still essential to trace the real identity of vehicle in certain controversial scenario, e.g. accident responsibility investigation. When the origin of a message is in dispute, someone should be able to reveal the real identity of the message sender. This requirement is beyond the non-repudiation that correlates the usage of pseudonym with a certain vehicle.
In our authentication framework, the real identity of a vehicle is confidential to the RSUs and the other peer vehicles. TA stores the vehicles' newest pseudonym and is the only party who can disclose a vehicle's real identity through its private key. We query attacker(skTA) to find if the adversary can get the private key of TA. The result not attacker_sskey_p6/p7(skTA[]) is true indicates the confidentiality of TA's private key. The verification result is given in Fig. 1d . Consequently, only TA can trace the real identity of a particular vehicle without any interference on the privacy of other legitimate vehicles.
D. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
The V2V communication should be built upon the mutual trust between vehicles. It relies on the mutual authentication achieved in both inner-RSU and cross-RSU manners. For simplicity, we automatically prove the mutual authenticity for the compound procedure in Table. 3.
Firstly, we verify the receiver V w 's activity on authenticating the sender V v . Vehicles get the random challenge u in V2I authentication phase when their pseudonyms are validated by RSU. Then they calculate the solution ϕ to the challenge u. In the compound procedure of V2V authentication, the vehicle V v broadcasts the authentication request, denoted by event Vv_broadcost. The vehicle V w receives the broadcasted request, and sends the ciphertexts of ϕ v and ϕ w to TA via its RSU, denoted by event Vw_SendToRSU. Then, V w receives the authentication result delivered from its RSU, denoted by event RSU_RespondVw. It verifies the signature SIG RSU j (PS l v ||0/1||t) in the result, and ensures the authenticity of V v 's pseudonym as well as the ownership of this pseudonym, denoted by event Vw_Accept. For the innner-RSU V2V authentication, we check the result of query event(Vw_Accept(PS_Vv))==>(event( RSU_RespondVw(id_RSU,PS_Vw,sign_Vv,sign_ Vw))==>(event(Vw_SendRSU(id_RSU,PS_Vw,Vv_ Ciphertext,Vw_Ciphertext))==>event(Vv_bro adcost(id_RSU,PS_Vv,Vv_Ciphertext)))). For the cross-RSU V2V authentication, we check the result of query event(Vw_Accept(PS_Vv))==>(event( RSU_RespondVw(id_RSUj,PS_Vw,sign_Vv,sign _Vw))==>(event(Vw_SendRSU(id_RSUj,PS_Vw, Vv_Ciphertext,Vw_Ciphertext))==>event(V v_broadcost(id_RSUi,PS_Vv,Vv_Ciphertext)) )). The results of both queries are true, as shown in Fig. 1e and Fig. 1f which means V v is authenticated by V w .
Then, we verify the V v 's activity on authenticating V w . In the inner-RSU V2V authentication, V w replies the signature on the authentication result of itself, i.e. SIG RSU j (PS l w ||0/1||t), to V v , which is denoted by event Vw_replyVv(PS_Vv,PS_Vw,sign_Vw). Then, V v verifies the signature and ensures the authenticity of V w 's pseudonym as well as the ownership of this pseudonym, denoted by event Vv_Accept. We check the result of query event(Vv_Accept(PS_Vw))==>(event( Vw_replyVv(PS_Vv,PS_Vw,sign_Vw))==>event (RSU_RespondVw(id_RSU,PS_Vw,sign_Vv,sign _Vw))). In the cross-RSU V2V authentication, V w replies to V v the signature on the authentication result of itself, along with the signed public key of its RSU, i.e. (pk RSU j , SIG TA (pk RSU j )), which is denoted by event Vw_ replyVv(PS_Vv, PS_Vw,sign_Vw, pbRSUj,var_ Rj_sign). We check the results of query event (Vv_Accept(PS_Vw))==>(event(Vw_replyVv (PS_Vv,PS_Vw,sign_Vw,pbRSUj,var_Rj_sign) )==>event(RSU_RespondVw(id_RSUj,PS_Vw, sign_Vv,sign_Vw))). The results of both queries are true, as shown in Fig. 1e and Fig. 1f , which means V w is authenticated by V v .
Furthermore, by applying inj-event instead of event for each query, we can ensure the freshness of authentication messages. The verification results after these substitutions are still true, that indicates the freshness of messages is held by our framework.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the efficiency of our authentication procedure in terms of computational overhead and communication overhead. For simplicity, we directly take the compound procedure of our framework in Table 3 for the comparisons with state-of-art randomized authentication approaches, e.g. RAU [14] and RAU+ [15] .
A. COMMUNICATION OVERHEADS
In order to evaluate the communication overhead of our approach in real scenarios, we use the urban mobility simulator SUMO (v0.19.0) [32] Fig. 2 . On each map, we simulate random trip for each vehicle with the total amount of vehicles ranging from 200 to 1000.
To simulate the communications of our authentication framework as well as the randomized authentications, we implement the communication procedure of both kinds of authentications and apply the procedures on each time interval defined by the simulation results of SUMO. In each time interval, both vehicles and RSUs have stationary coordinates. Then we can specify different ratios of inner-RSU to cross-RSU V2V authentications for the vehicles in the range of each RSU to quantify the communication overheads. We suppose the transmission rates among vehicles and between vehicle and RSU is 6 Mbps. The network delay is 20 ms. On each map, the coverage radius of each RSU is set to 490 meters, and we spread 35 to 45 RSUs evenly on each map to cover the area of the map. Following the length of randomized identity in RAU+, we suppose the length of pseudonym is 128 bytes. To fit the length of pseudonym, the length of n in Paillier's encryption system should be 64 bytes. The signature and the public key of TA are respectively a pair of numbers with length (64+64)=128 bytes. Let the identity of RSU be 20 bytes, and let the time stamp be 8 bytes. For RAU+, we used AES-128 with 128-bit key for the message encryption of identity validations.
The objective of V2V authentication is to ensure that in every time interval, each vehicle should mutually authenticate with another vehicle, which should be in the range of the same RSU for our approach. Under such objective, we calculate the maximal communication overhead of an individual RSU and compare it with the peak communication overhead of verification server in RAU and RAU+. The results are illustrated in Fig. 3 . We can see in the map of Xi'an and Shenzhen, our approach outperforms RAU+, whereas in the map of Shanghai, there is an abnormal case. This is because, for the randomly generated vehicle traces at Shanghai, there is an instantaneous boost that more than 1/3 of vehicles crowded in the range of one RSU, that makes this specific RSU more busy than the verification server of RAU+. We then compare Then we compare the communication overheads at the vehicle side. The inner-RSU and cross-RSU V2V authentication take different message lengths between vehicles, thus the ratio of vehicles who participate in inner-RSU or cross-RSU V2V authentication may have an impact on the overall communication overhead. Here we suppose u = N inner /(N inner + N cross ) is the proportion of vehicles who participate in inner-RSU V2V authentication. Another factor that influences the vehicle-side communication overhead is the ratio of the number of V2I authentications to the number of V2V authentications for each vehicle. The vehicle-side overhead under different ratios of V2I to V2V authentications are presented in Fig. 4 . From the results, we know the ratio u has only trifling impact on the communication overheads. The curves of RAU and RAU+ are horizontal because they do not consider cross-server case for cloud-based verification server. To address the ratio of V2I to V2V authentications, we can observe that, the more slowly the vehicles move and more frequently they perform V2V authentication, i.e. in more crowded area, our framework will be more likely to outperform RAU+.
B. COMPUTATIONAL OVERHEADS
We compare the computational overheads of our framework with randomized authentications in term of the cost of cryptographic primitives. From a comparable perspective, we measure the time cost of each cryptographic primitive using the implementation of Paillier PKE [29] as well as the implementation of AES in package javax.crypto, on a PC with Intel Core i5-6500 3.20GHz×4 CPU and 8GB RAM. The time costs of cryptographic primitives are listed in Table 5 . Here we take SHA1 as the specific operation of hash function.
In the V2I authentication of our framework, a vehicle generates new pseudonym to join an RSU for getting the public key of RSU and the random challenge. It then verifies the signature of RSU's public key pk RSU and solves the received challenge. In contrast, both RAU and RAU+ require the vehicle and registration server (RS) to recalculate new randomized identity, and RAU+ also requires to update the secret key of vehicle on both sides in the same time interval.
In the V2V authentication of our framework, our approach is divided into inner-RSU and cross-RSU V2V authentication. For the inner-RSU authentication, the sender vehicle encrypts the solution ϕ v and broadcasts it with the identity of its RSU. The receiver vehicle gets the ciphertext of ϕ v , encrypts its solution ϕ w , and delivers both ciphertexts of solution to TA through its RSU. Later, the sender and receiver vehicle will respectively verify the signature indicating the authentication result of the peer vehicle. Therefore, each vehicle involves homomorphic encryptions and one signature verification. For the cross-RSU authentication, when the sender vehicle V v does not have the public key of RSU j , there is one more signature verification by V v to ensure the integrity of pk RSU j .
In RAU, the identity validation between vehicles involves a Diffie-Hellman key exchange to generate the shared random number k u 1 u 2 . The ownership validation of RAU relies on the property of homomorphic encryption. One vehicle generates a random challenge, the other vehicle solves the challenge, and vice versa. Therefore, the authentication involves one challenge generation and one challenge solution for each vehicle. In RAU+, the vehicle leverages symmetric encryption, e.g. AES-128 in our evaluation, to encrypt random numbers and randomized identities with a corresponding secret key for the identity validation.
We take the same objective of V2V authentication as in the evaluation of communication overheads, and compare the maximal computational overhead of infrastructures in our approach with the peak computational overhead of servers in RAU and RAU+. Fig. 5 presents the computational overheads of infrastructures. Our approach outperforms the randomized authentications in each case. Moreover, the server side of RAU is even more cost-effective than RAU+ due to the absence of time-consuming encryptions. To address the aggregated procedures, we know for 10 senders of authentication requests, the RSU in our framework costs 28.58 µs on the computation of aggregated authentication. The computational overhead reduces by 90% compared with nonaggregated form. On the other hand, the verification server of RAU+ takes 399.53 µs to perform the computation for the aggregated identity validation in this 10-sender case.
For the computational overheads on each vehicle, we vary the ratio u from 0 to 1, and observe the costs at different ratios of V2I to V2V authentications, as shown in Fig. 6 . Due to the significant cost of homomorphic encryptions and signatures, our approach is not as efficient as state-ofart randomized authentications on the vehicle side. However, the excessive computations (≤1 ms) are affordable by COTS hardware or software, and obviously less significant compared with the vehicle-side communication overheads (40 to 90 ms).
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present Ridra, a rigorous decentralized randomized authentication framework with conditional privacy preservation. This mutual authentication framework can ensure Level 3 privacy with unlinkability, traceability, and conditional non-repudiation. The classification of V2V authentications benefits the vehicle-side performance, and the decentralized deployment of pseudonym validation and ownership validation make our approach generally more efficient than other randomized authentications on server side. Future work includes extending our framework over density uneven roadside infrastructures to mitigate the communication overhead caused by the instantaneous boost of vehicles at certain local areas.
